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S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
Beginning in 1978, the reform and opening policiesfirst promoted by Deng Xiaoping led the People’sRepublic of China onto a path of rapid economic
growth and sharp social change. These policies allowed the
gradual dissemination of market processes, especially in
terms of the allocation of production factors (labour, land,
and capital). Even while markets remain far from complete
and quite highly constrained, this partial liberalisation has
given rise to a rapid pace of capital accumulation, and to a
geographical and sectoral redistribution of the Chinese
workforce. In particular, China has experienced increasing
migration of labourers from rural agricultural areas to indus-
trialised cities. Although the high mobility and marginalised
living conditions of migrant rural workers make accurate es-
timates of their number difficult, existing studies have ar-
rived at a commonly accepted estimate of the growth in this
population from around 2 million in the mid-1980s to about
94 million in 2002. In other words, by the beginning of the
twenty-first century, rural-urban migration affected as much
as 12 percent of the total Chinese workforce, and nearly a
fifth of the rural active population.((1)
The scope of this phenomenon gives it a crucial significance
for the overall development of the People’s Republic, as well
as for the daily life of China’s rural inhabitants, and it has
naturally aroused much interest and debate in academic as
well as political circles regarding its causes, evolution, and
ramifications on economic development and social order. So
far, on the micro side, the relevant economic literature has
focused mainly on the specific characteristics of migrants,
holding the classical Todarian view that differentials in
labour revenues were the main motive for migration.((2)
Moreover, on the macro side, much of the political and so-
cial debate about Chinese internal migration seems to rely
on the implicit assumption that this phenomenon is compa-
rable to the exode rural that took place during Europe’s in-
dustrialisation in the nineteenth century, and in most devel-
oping countries during the twentieth century. Rural-urban
migration is thus seen, in a Lewisian manner,((3) as the nec-
essary corollary of capital accumulation, industrialisation,
and urbanisation.The  t emporary nature of  rural -urban migration
However, this economic theoretical framework and historical
baseline example does not seem to account for one of the
most striking features of the Chinese migrant population,
namely that it is a “floating population” (liudong renkou).
Indeed, apart from numerical importance, another specific
feature of rural-urban migration flows in China is their tem-
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Collective ownership of agricultural land and the remains of the administrative management of rural economy have
imposed considerable insecurity on the land use rights of Chinese farmers. This insecurity constrains the movement
of rural people, who fear that migration will jeopardise what land use rights they do enjoy. In this paper we describe
the idiosyncratic uncertainty of land use rights, and verify its influence on migration decisions, with a special focus
on the duration of migration.
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porality. It appears that most rural-urban migrants return to
their native rural areas after some years spent working in in-
formal urban labour markets,((4) and that out-migration is
merely a stage in the life-cycle of rural households or individ-
uals. For example, in our data, about 75 percent of the rural
migrants are under 35 years old, suggesting that rural-urban
migration characterises the first stage of a rural individual’s
working life.
Moreover, even during this migratory stage of life, rural mi-
grants keep moving back and forth between their home vil-
lages and the destination urban areas.((5) For example, in our
data sample, only 5 percent of the migrants did not return to
their home village in 2002, and 60 percent of them spent
less than 9 months outside their home county. The distribu-
tion of rural migrants according to the length of their out-mi-
gration in 2002, plotted in Figure 1, clearly reflects the tem-
poral mobility of rural migrants and the diversity of their be-
haviours.
China’s rural migrant population thus displays striking tem-
poral characteristics: migrations appear temporary, that is,
out-migration constitutes a transitory stage in a rural individ-
ual’s life pattern, and is a phenomenon of repeated moves
between home and destination areas rather than a more or
less permanent settling. In fact, contemporary Chinese news-
paper reports and officials speeches refer to the rural mi-
grant population almost exclusively as the “floating popula-
tion,” explicitly stressing its high temporal mobility. The
main objective of this paper is to shed some light on this
temporary feature of rural migrant flows.
Causes  of  temporary mig ration 
The temporary migration phenomenon, which is quite com-
mon in developing countries, is not a new issue in econom-
ics, and has already given birth to a wide literature. From an
economic standpoint, the first general explanation given to
account for temporary migration is changes in the revenue
differentials between origin and destination areas due, for
example, to agricultural seasonality. John Knight and Lina
Song,((6) as well as Claude Aubert and Li Xiande,((7) con-
vincingly apply this reasoning to the case of China. Sec-
ondly, temporary migration can be caused by exogenous im-
pacts on the legal and/or professional situations of migrants.
Oded Galor and Oded Stark((8) observed that the instability
of informal labour markets and the fragility of the adminis-
trative situation of many undocumented migrants can force
some of them to return home. This analysis is quite relevant
in the case of Chinese rural migrants, whose urban residen-
tial rights are limited and easily challenged in an institutional
context of controlled population movement. Thirdly, re-
peated returns to the home area could be explained by the
psychological cost of migration, and especially family ties.
As time passes, the cost of being far from home and family
increases. Technically, in this case, economic models nor-
mally assume that consumption at home brings a higher util-
ity than consumption at the migrant’s destination (as in the
work of Slobodan Djajic and Ross Milbourne),((9) or impute
financial “explicit costs” and “implicit psychic costs” to mi-
gration, as in Zhao Yaohui’s((10) terminology. But in this case,
the back-pulling force is assumed rather than explained.
Fourthly, the high mobility of migrants could be due to a
process of geographical searching, in which migrants lack in-
formation on destination labour markets and thus look for
the best destination through circular migration, as pointed
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out in the pioneering work of Gautam Bhattacharya.((11)
Fifthly and finally, temporary migrations can express the be-
haviour of households willing to spread risk among sectors
and localities, as conceptualised by Oded Stark.((12) In this
framework, people leave for cities in order to cope with
volatile agricultural income, making migration an insurance
device.
Spec ifi c  f eatures  of  the  Chinese  case  
All these explanations are likely to play a role in understand-
ing Chinese internal migration temporality. Furthermore,
two specific characteristics of China labour and land markets
clearly affect the migration decisions of Chinese rural house-
holds.
Firstly, from the 1950s onward, Chinese people have been
enrolled in a “household registration system” or hukou
framework. In the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese individuals’
places of residence and work were strictly defined through
this institution.((13) Although controls on mobility have been
relaxed during the last two decades, the very existence of
this hukou system still constrains the movement of rural peo-
ple, mainly because, as Dorothy J. Solinger((14) succinctly
states, “civil/social rights and prerogatives, such as the right
to subsistence, education, dwelling, employment, and med-
ical care are denied to migrants in the cities.” They thus re-
main second-class citizens in urban areas, and though the
hukou rural/urban divide has become clearly less hermetic
since the beginning of the reform era, it still firmly hinders
the permanent settlement of rural migrants in cities. 
Secondly, the decollectivisation of rural economy and agri-
cultural production, initiated at the end of the 1970s, has
never been completed. To be more specific, in 1978, the
rural People’s Communes were dismantled, and more free-
dom was granted to farming households. However, property
rights have remained in the hands of village collective au-
thorities, and rural households have only been conceded
land use rights. These land use rights were to be allocated
through a well-defined contractual framework, the “House-
hold Responsibility System,” but in fact, contracts, and es-
pecially contract lengths, have not been fulfilled by collective
authorities, who have maintained the habit of periodically
reallocating collective land among their fellow villagers. This
situation creates a manifest uncertainty for rural households
about the durability of their land tenure. Moreover, this un-
certainty is quite variable from one locality to another ac-
cording to village-level collective management of land, and
from one plot to another, according to the varying contrac-
tual status of land parcels.((15) In this paper we will focus on
this peculiar aspect of rural China institutions and the con-
sequent uncertainty of land rights, to shed some light on the
temporary aspect of Chinese rural migration.
The problem of land rights uncertainty in developing coun-
tries and emerging economies has already given birth to a
wide literature focusing on the link between land rights and
rural household behaviour, especially productive invest-
ment.((16) For example, in a reference work((17) on the case of
China, Hanan G. Jacoby, Li Guo, and Scott Rozelle study
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A Chinese farmer works on land 
situated close to Beijing. 
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the relationship between the insecurity of land use rights
(based on contractual classification and  land collective man-
agement policies) and the use of organic fertilizer, which can
be considered an investment because of its middle-term im-
provement of soil quality. The study shows that, as expected,
a household with less security in relation to a given plot will
use less fertilizer. As for the impact of land rights insecurity
on migration, past studies((18) have already tried to establish,
theoretically as well as empirically, that in the case of China,
the remnant of collective land management acts as a hin-
drance to migration. Indeed, a rural individual migrating out
of his village and thus neglecting his land is likely to see his
land endowment at least partially seized by collective authori-
ties for reallocation to fellow villagers who remain actively in-
volved in agriculture. In such a context, leaving one’s own land
for the purpose of migration creates a risk of losing it to more
consistently present individuals during the next reallocation.
The objective of our study is thus to establish a link between
land rights uncertainty and migration decisions in China.
More specifically, we attempt to show that Chinese rural in-
dividuals are exposed to an idiosyncratic risk of being de-
prived of their land use rights, and that this risk or uncer-
tainty regarding future land endowments acts as a constraint
on their migration decisions, and especially on the length of
their out-migration.
The first assumption we thus have to ground is that rural indi-
viduals face an idiosyncratic risk of losing their land use rights.Land rights  insecur ity  in  China
In 1978, with the implementation of the Household Re-
sponsibility System, People’s Commune rural agricultural
land was divided into various plots, which were then granted
to rural households on a contractual basis. This framework
has remained more or less unchanged up to the present. The
underlying idea behind this institutional scheme was to give
rural households relative freedom in their productive
choices, and to grant them secure land use rights as a means
of promoting individual investment. However, as mentioned
earlier, land contracts have been only partially fulfilled by vil-
lage collective authorities, who have not completely given up
their control over agricultural land allocation. Administrative
redistribution, in particular, continues as before. As a result,
rural households enjoy less secure land rights than envi-
sioned by the central authorities under the official frame-
work of the Household Responsibility System. In this con-
text, security of rights over a specific plot of land depends on
three factors: the village authorities’ land management, the
contractual status of the plot, and the characteristics of the
plot rights owner.
Indeed, even if the Household Responsibility System
scheme was designed to be applied uniformly throughout
mainland China, its actual implementation by village author-
ities takes very differing forms. Despite the existence of land
contracts, administrative redistribution persists, with fre-
quency and criteria differing considerably from one village to
the next, as documented by James Kai-sing Kung((19) and Liu
Shouying, Michael R. Carter, and Yang Yao.((20) The first di-
mension of variation in land rights uncertainty is thus geo-
graphical, as land rights security varies from village to village
according to local political choices regarding agricultural land
management and the actual implementation of the House-
hold Responsibility System.
In terms of the second dimension of variation, different
kinds of land contracts are defined under the framework of
the Household Responsibility System, and Chinese rural
households use agricultural land under various land tenure
types and rights. Five major tenure types are officially sanc-
tioned by the national government:((21) private plot (ziliu di),
grain ration land (kouliang tian), contract land (chengbao
tian), responsibility land (zeren tian), and reclaimed land
(kaihuang di). Generally speaking, the property rights on all
agricultural land remain in the hands of the village collective
authorities, and there is no private land ownership in any
real sense. Moreover, each tenure type encompasses a dif-
ferent set of rights and obligations for rural households, and
guarantees a different level of security. In particular, rural
households have almost complete control, except for the
right of title transfer, over private plots and grain ration
lands, generally without obligation. Responsibility land, con-
tract land, and reclaimed land, on the other hand, impose
various obligations, such as the delivery of a mandatory
quota of grain to the state at below-market prices, and can
S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
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be quite easily taken away by collective authorities for allo-
cation to other households. 
To simplify our analysis, we will consider the last three types
of land to be easily transferred and reallocated among house-
holds by the collective, while the first two are not. Moreover,
given that rural private plots are qualitatively comparable and
quantitatively marginal compared with grain ration land, we
will include both types under the label “grain ration land.”
For similar reasons, we will collectively deal with responsibil-
ity land, contract land, and reclaimed land under the label
“responsibility land.” In our analysis, we distinguish between
these two kinds of land tenures, and deal with “responsibil-
ity land” as subject to a threat of reallocation, whereas a
household’s use rights over “grain ration land” can be con-
sidered comparatively secure and stable. The second dimen-
sion of variation in land rights uncertainty is thus contractual,
as different plots with different contractual status exhibit dif-
fering degrees of security.
Finally, the local collective rules regarding land management
and individual contracts are not explicitly established. The crite-
ria for administrative land reallocation, as well as the reasons to
fulfil contracts or not, remain implicit and somewhat arbitrary.
In such a context, household and individual characteristics, such
as the number of people in the family, the number of family
members engaged in working life, gender, household labour al-
location, social status, etc., are likely to play a role in a house-
hold’s or individual’s access to land. The third dimension of
variation in land rights definition and security is thus personal.
The overall result is that land use rights insecurity appears to
be idiosyncratic and dependant on village-level, plot-level,
and individual/household-level characteristics. Different
rural individuals thus face different risks of being deprived of
their rights while out-migrating. We can intuitively expect
people facing a lower risk over their land endowment to mi-
grate more or for longer periods, whereas people with higher
risk should feel a more acute necessity to stay home to de-
fend and assert their rights. If our analysis is correct, we
should empirically observe that elevated idiosyncratic land
rights insecurity reduces migration length. Empir ical  insights
For our empirical investigation, we rely on a survey con-
ducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
29N o  2 0 0 8 / 2
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(CASS) in 2003. Carried out during the 2003 Spring Fes-
tival, it inquired into the situation of rural households during
the preceding year. This survey has four main advantages:
First, the set of questions was quite comprehensive, and cov-
ers a wide range of aspects of rural life. Second, the survey
relies on a very large sampling: 37,969 individuals from
9,200 households distributed across 22 provinces,((22) drawn
up from NBS data in order to be representative of China’s
population as a whole. Third, it was conducted during the
Spring Festival, a time of traditional familial gathering dur-
ing which many migrants had returned their hometowns.
Fourth and last, but not least, this individual and household-
level survey is complemented by extensive data on village-
level characteristics. These four factors make this survey
highly relevant to the study of Chinese internal migration.
Is  the  surv ey  sample  r epresentativ e?
We felt it necessary, nevertheless, to verify that the survey sam-
ple is representative of China’s overall population; if not, the ex-
ternal validity of our analysis would be jeopardised, and we
would not be able to draw conclusions for China as whole.
Therefore, we compared simple descriptions of the population
characteristics inferred from the survey data with those given for
the various provinces in the National Bureau of Statistics of
China (NBS) Statistical Yearbooks. It appears that in terms of
age structure, gender ratio, and household composition, the sur-
vey results are very similar to the national statistics. It is interest-
ing to note, however, that when we focus on working people,
the survey results for some provinces diverge from the NBS es-
timates. Notably, the share of working people in the overall pop-
ulation was higher in the survey data than in the Statistical Year-
books for some provinces such as Anhui, Jiangxi, Guangxi,
Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Sichuan, while it appears that these
provinces also have the highest proportion of people working
outside their home county for at least six months out of a year.
How can we reconcile the survey with the NBS data? 
In fact, it is quite likely that the survey, carried out during a
traditional time of familial gathering, interviewed workers
who would not appear in the national data, because they are
simply not at home most of the year. It is thus easy to under-
stand why the provinces that are the main sources of Chi-
nese internal migration have a higher worker population in
the survey data than in the national statistics. All in all, we
can assume that the survey population was well sampled and
can be considered representative of the Chinese population
as a whole. Our assumption in this regard is further strength-
ened by our data on migrant population characteristics. 
Who are  the  migrants?
We must first define migration and delineate our survey mi-
grant population. Migration is usually defined in relation to
two criteria: place of work, and length of work. The National
Bureau of Statistics defines a migrant as an individual who
has left his place of residence registration in order to work
for at least six months. For the purpose of this study, which
is particularly concerned with the temporal dimension of mi-
gration, we define as a migrant any individual who says that
he worked out of his usual place of residence during the past
year, whatever the length of his out migration. The only re-
striction we put on this definition is geographical, namely
that the place of work must be not only outside of the indi-
vidual’s home village and township, but also outside of the
individual’s home county. The imposition of this criterion
may appear arbitrary, given that even individuals working
within their county but out their township can live far from
their household, or sleep in dorms at their workplace and
not visit their family for months. However, Chinese town-
ships can be quite small, and there may be many workers
commuting to work outside their home township but within
their home county. As for counties, the mean area is larger,
and commuting should be a less viable option. In 2002,
there were 44,850 township-level divisions, and 2,860
county-level divisions. Given that China as a whole meas-
ures 9.33 million square kilometres, townships average a bit
more than 200 square kilometres in area, while counties are
in average more than 3,260 square kilometres. In rural
areas, the average area is slightly larger, but the difference
between these two hierarchical levels remains huge. It fol-
lows from these geographical considerations that workers
who stay within their home county can quite easily be com-
muters, and as such are not included in our definition of mi-
grant workers. 
To confirm the relevance of our definition of migrant work-
ers, we first examine the plausibility of the resulting figures
for the migrant population. According to the survey results,
15.4 percent of rural workers spent some time working out-
side their home county in 2002. That is, 9 percent of the
rural population are migrant workers. If we assume a repre-
sentative sampling, this means that 9 percent of the 853.24
million rural residents of the sampled provinces are migrants,
and that 82.6 million individuals left their rural households
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Land Rights and Rural-urban Migration in China
to work outside their county in 2002. If we further suppose
that the 22 provinces in our sample are representative of
China’s national situation, it would mean that 93 million
rural individuals migrated in 2002.((23) In fact, this corre-
sponds remarkably well with previous estimates of the size
of the floating population, and reaffirms our confidence in
the representative nature of the survey sample.
Migrant  character is t ics
Before focusing on the impact of land rights on migration de-
cisions, we need a clear idea of who the migrants are. Com-
pared with other rural workers, migrants tend to be younger
and better educated.
They are less likely to be married, and are less often the
head of their household. Being married decreases the prob-
ability of migrating by 37 percent. Men make up a larger
share than in the population as a whole: the probability of
migrating is 50 percent higher for men than for women. 
Among households with migrant members, 72 percent have
only one member migrating, 22 percent have two members
working outside the county, and 6 percent have three or
more members working as migrants.
Regarding the place of work, the majority of migrant work-
ers are long-distance migrants, working outside their
province of origin.
These descriptive statistics are consistent with previous stud-
ies on the migrant population. We can now investigate the
core of our research on migration decisions, and assess the
impact of land rights insecurity in terms of village propensity
to reallocate, social resources, and land tenure type.
Migrants  shorten  out-mig ration when a real location is  l ike ly  t o occur
Our survey found that village authorities have different atti-
tudes toward administrative land reallocations. Some have
never reallocated land since the Household Responsibility
System was implemented at the end of the 1970s, while oth-
ers have carried out periodic reallocations at a relatively high
frequency. Moreover, decisions regarding reallocation can be
taken at either an administrative or natural village level, and
their extent can vary greatly from partial reallocation (tiliu ji-
31N o  2 0 0 8 / 2
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dong tian) to village-wide readjustment (tiaozheng). In our
sample, more than two-thirds of villages carry out realloca-
tions at the natural village level. Interestingly enough, when
reallocations are conducted at a higher level and concern the
administrative village level, they appear to be much more fre-
quent.
In 1998, a Land Management Law sought to strengthen
land tenure security and reduce the frequency of land read-
justments((24) by requiring the agreement of two thirds of the
“villager representatives” (cunmin daibiao) and the approval
of the township government responsible for agriculture.
Even so, 40 percent of the villages surveyed in our sample
have conducted at least one village-wide reallocation since
1998, and in some of them reallocations have occurred
nearly every year. 
As a measure of village-level risk, we also considered partial
reallocations, which are more likely to occur. A labourer
faced a higher uncertainty over her land rights in 2002 if her
village conducted a partial reallocation. In 2002, 23 percent
of villages conducted such a reallocation.
This does not provide the risk of reallocation per se, but all
places where reallocation occurred were places where there
was a risk of reallocation in 2002. This is an ex post measure
of risk, since not all places facing a risk of reallocation actually
experienced reallocation. But if such a risk has an impact on
migration decisions, then we should see people taking this risk
into account in places where a reallocation occurred.
If we plot the density of rural migrants according to the num-
ber of days they spent working outside their home county
under two different situations, whether a reallocation oc-
curred or not in 2002, we distinguish two very different tem-
porality patterns. The following graph clearly indicates that
the mean duration of migration was much lower in places
where a reallocation occurred.
The red curve, representing the density of migration durations
when people faced reallocation, is shifted to the left compared
with the black curve, which represents the density when no
reallocation occurred. This clearly indicates that migrant work-
ers shorten their migration when a reallocation takes place.
The main peak indicates the highest frequency, the mode of
migration length, in the sample population, which came out at
around 280 days for migrant workers facing a reallocation in
2002, against 330 days where no reallocation occurred. 
These results are consistent with our first hypothesis, namely
that migrant decisions are affected by land rights uncertainty.
Women’s  ri ghts a re  l ess  secure
All individuals do not face an equal level of risk when a re-
allocation occurs, with the result that gender determines dif-
ferent migration patterns. Gender is associated with quite
complex issues regarding land and migration. 
Migrant women are very often at a disadvantage during land
reallocation.((25) Legally, women and men should have simi-
lar rights regarding land; article 48 of China’s Constitution,
article 28 and 30 of the Law on Protecting Women’s Rights
and Interests of the PRC, the Marriage Law of 2001 (in
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particular article 39), and article 10 of the Inheritance Law
of 1985 all assert that women enjoy equal land rights.((26) In
some villages, however, women are entitled to less land than
men under explicit reallocation rules.
The situation is further complicated by the tradition calling
for a married woman to move to her husband’s village.((27)
Virilocal marriage, that is, marriage where the woman leaves
her natal village to join her husband’s village, has been al-
most universal throughout Chinese history, and applied to an
estimated 92 to 98 percent of rural Chinese marriages at the
end of the 1990s.((28) Since only men can inherit land,
women often have to wait for the next reallocation to occur.
Two situations can arise: If a woman’s place of residence has
not been transferred to her husband’s village, her land in her
village of origin is threatened under reallocation, even
though it should remain in her hands. If her hukou has been
transferred to their husband’s village, on the other hand, she
often has to wait for the next land adjustment, and even then
she must strongly defend her interests. Last but not least, sin-
gle working women come under great pressure, since their
fellow villagers expect them to leave their village in the near
future, and they are at a disadvantage if a reallocation oc-
curs.((29) For this reason, they may have a stronger incentive
to be in their village during a reallocation. 
The two following graphs represent reallocation’s impact on
men and women. We know that once married, men and women
face quite different situations, even with respect to the law. (It
is only since 2003 that the New Rural Law has stressed mar-
ried women’s rights.((30)) Furthermore, once children are born,
family life imposes different roles on women and men. In order
to focus on the specific issue of gender rather than marriage,
therefore, we focus on the situation for single workers. 
The impact is indicated by the gap between the black and red
curves, which suggests that the impact of reallocation is greater
for women. Gender thus turns out to be a contributing factor
in the idiosyncratic insecurity of rural individuals’ land rights. 
We will complete our analysis of the links between land
rights and migration decisions with the final dimension of
land use rights insecurity, namely plot-level.
Grain  ration  land provides a  measure  o f  s ecur ity
In the 1980s, Pingdu, a county-level city in Shandong
Province, implemented an original system of land manage-
ment in order to meet the demands of efficiency without sac-
rificing the objectives of equity.((31) In 1986, Pingdu estab-
lished two types of land tenure: one to fulfil basic consump-
tion needs, and the other aimed at increasing productivity.
The former type was referred to as grain ration land. A sim-
ilar “two-land system” quickly spread throughout rural
33N o  2 0 0 8 / 2
26. As stressed in Fu Chen, Wang Liming, and John Davis, “Land Reform in Rural China
Since the Mid-1980s,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Sustain-
able Development Department, 1999, paper available at the following address:
ftp://ftp.fao.org/sd/sda/sdaa/LR98_2/art-9.pdf.
27. Burton Pasternak, “On the Cause and Demographic Consequences of Uxorilocal Mar-
riage in China,” in S.B. Hanley S. B. and A.P. Wolf (eds.), Family and Population in East
Asian History, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1985.
28. Jin Xiaoyi, Li Shuzhuo, and Marcus W. Feldman, “Marriage Form and Fertility in Rural
China,” Morrison Institute for Population and Resource Studies Working Paper 101,
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 2004.
29. As pointed out in Denise Hare, Yang Li, and Daniel Englander, “Land Management in
Rural China and Its Gender Implications,” Feminist Economics, vol. 13, n° 3-4, 2007, pp.
35-61.
30. An English translation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Land Contract in
Rural Areas, which went into effect in 2003, is available at the following address:
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/09/content_75300.htm.
31. Fu Chen, Wang Liming, and John Davis, art. cit.
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
China, although it was not implemented everywhere. Twenty
years later, this system is slowly disappearing, as grain ration
land is granted with decreasing frequency to rural house-
holds. In 2002, however, this distinction was still relevant:
more than 70 percent of the surveyed villages allocated some
grain ration land in 2002. This allows us to define a plot-level
dimension of land rights insecurity based on type of plot
tenure. Since grain ration land is sometimes referred to as the
rural “iron rice bowl,” we can rely on its very existence to an-
swer two sets of questions: Firstly, we have elements to deter-
mine whether land rights uncertainty influences migration du-
ration. The coexistence of two different tenure types provides
a means of better capturing the risks taken by migrant work-
ers who leave their land. Secondly, since grain ration land
was designed for a specific task, it also sheds light on migrant
people’s insurance needs. If a temporary migrant faces a
higher risk of loosing her responsibility land, then her land
rights security should increase with the proportion of grain ra-
tion land she can rely on. Similarly, the absence of grain ra-
tion land should be associated with shorter migration dura-
tion. The following graphs provide empirical results consis-
tent with this analysis: the possession of kouliang tian is a crit-
ical factor in migrant behaviour. We present results for single
women, since their greater vulnerability makes them the most
sensitive to differences in tenure types.
The peaks correspond to the mode of migration durations in
the survey data. For women who did not face a reallocation in
2002, the possession (red curve) or lack (black curve) of
grain ration land does not greatly affect the pattern of migra-
tion duration. The observed gap even seems to indicate that
women who possess some grain ration land migrate less in
general. The second graph, however, exhibits a striking differ-
ence between the two curves; possession of grain ration land
seems to be of crucial importance to women facing a realloca-
tion. The black curve, representing the density of migration
days for single women who have no grain ration land, is
shifted to the left, and the peak at around 9 months is consid-
erably lower. It appears, then, that single women react dramat-
ically to a reallocation when their households do not possess
any grain ration land.
We have seen that the three characteristics – village-level,
plot-level, and individual level – modulating land rights inse-
curity are all associated with shorter migration durations. Re-
allocation encourages migrant workers to return earlier. This
is especially the case for women. However, if these women
possess some grain ration land, they can afford to migrate for
longer periods, while those lacking any kouliang tian shorten
the duration of their migration. Combined together, these
three characteristics indicate how uncertainty in land use
rights affects migrant workers’ decisions.Conclusion 
Our work was founded on two main hypotheses: First, that
land use rights insecurity acts as a constraint on the migra-
tion decisions of Chinese rural households due to the threat
of collective authorities seizing the land of out-migrating in-
dividuals; and second, that this insecurity is idiosyncratic,
and depends on village-level, plot-level, and house-
hold/individual-level characteristics. We can thus expect
people facing a higher risk of losing their land use rights to
migrate less, or for shorter periods. 
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Empirical observation confirms this analysis. When a land re-
allocation occurs, rural migrants cut short their out-migration in
order to defend and assert their rights in their home village, as
our data clearly show for the year 2002. But the exposure to
this land seizure risk is modulated by the contractual status of
land plots. “Grain ration land” (kouliang tian), in particular, is
more secure than “responsibility land” (zeren tian). Indeed,
the survey results indicate that people whose land includes a
larger share of kouliang tian can afford to migrate more and
longer when a reallocation occurs. Last but not least, different
households and different individuals manifest different levels of
informal power or social influence. Women’s rights, especially,
can be expected to be more easily challenged and jeopardised
than men’s. Indeed, the survey data indicate that women’s out-
migration decisions are more heavily constrained by village-
level and plot-level insecurity than men’s are. All in all, our hy-
potheses appear to be consistent with the survey data.
It is well established, theoretically as well as empirically, that
collective ownership of agricultural land and the corresponding
insecurity of individual rights constrains rural development. In-
deed, the lack of long-term time perspective due to inadequate
private rights prevents farmers from investing on their land, be-
cause the fruits of their investment could well be enjoyed by
others. Hanan G. Jacoby, Li Guo, and Scott Rozelle,((32) for
example, have provided convincing evidence of a link between
land rights insecurity and fertilizer use in the case of China.
Moreover, as Dong Xiaoyuan points out,((33) “Collective own-
ership makes land unsuitable as collateral for loans,” and this
clearly reduces Chinese farmers’ access to formal credit. Gen-
erally speaking, the lack of private property rights and, conse-
quently, of land markets, can be seen as a hindrance to efficient
allocation and use of land. One further item has recently been
added to this list of potential drawbacks to land collective own-
ership, namely the constraint on rural people’s movement
caused by land rights insecurity. In the case of China, the
aforementioned works by Dennis Tao Yang,((34) Bryan
Lohmar,((35) and Shi Xiaoxia((36) have already focused on this
issue, and our present study confirms their results. 
Collective land ownership thus appears to complement the
hukou household registration system in the Chinese framework
of population movement control. Indeed, the rural/urban di-
vide embedded in the hukou prevents most rural people from
definitively settling in cities and keeps them in a marginal and
disadvantaged position in urban centres. The hukou institution
thus acts as a back-pushing force on rural-urban migrants, while
collective ownership of land and the correlative insecurity of in-
dividual land use rights act as a back-pulling force on these mi-
grants.
On first sight, Chinese rural institutions thus appear to form
an effective barrier to land exchanges and labour movements,
and therefore to the efficient allocation of these production
factors. Moreover, as land rights insecurity is idiosyncratic
and especially affects rural individuals with little informal
power or social influence, the cumulative constraint on migra-
tion is more acute for people with fewer opportunities in rural
areas. For example, women’s land use rights are less secure
than men’s, as a result of which their out-migration opportu-
nities are constrained by higher risks and costs, and this ex-
acerbates their secondary social status, as men have more
chances to acquire financial means and social recognition
through successful out-migration to urban centres. All these
analyses ultimately militate for a radical privatisation of land
rights in China on the grounds of efficiency as well as equity. 
It turns out, however, that Chinese farmers do not generally
seem to favour such an evolution, as James Kai-sing Kung
and Liu Shouying((37) were the first to notice during their in-
quiry into Chinese farmers’ preferences. It is thus possible
that all these drawbacks of collective land ownership are
seen, in Chinese rural areas, as the price to pay for as yet
under-studied benefits of this institutional framework. For
example, even if land use rights on individual plots are not
guaranteed through time, the collective management of land
ensures access to agricultural land for any rural individual. It
could thus constitute an insurance device for Chinese rural
residents, who, generally speaking, are sorely lacking in all
kinds of social security services. Our study results seem to
support this intuition, with reliance on the land indicated by
the huge proportion of people who tend to shorten their stay
in cities when a reallocation occurs. Even if the land is in it-
self insufficient to support a household’s living, and even if
members of a farming household aspire to off-farm occupa-
tions nearby or in distant cities, the land remains a form of
protection when the future is uncertain. •
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Glossary
liudong renkou 流動人口
hukou 戶口
ziliu di 自留地
kouliang tian 口糧田
chengbao tian 承包田
zeren tian 責任田
kaihuang di 開荒地
tiliu jidong tian 提留機動田
tiaozheng 調整
cunmin daibiao 村民代表
